I’m the Never Ending Pie Throwing Robot, aka NEPTR.

Linux enthusiast, programmer, and privacy advocate. I’m nearly done with an IT Security degree.

TL;DR I am a nerd.

  • 0 Posts
  • 24 Comments
Joined 7 months ago
cake
Cake day: November 20th, 2024

help-circle








  • N.E.P.T.R@lemmy.blahaj.zonetoLinux@lemmy.mlHardening Mint
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    2
    ·
    4 months ago

    I watched the video. Yes, if your sandbox config is weak then it will allow sandbox escapes. I agree the should default should be a secure sandbox. Bubblewrap offers the opportunity to shoot yourself in the foot. Look into the others tools I mentioned if you want to see different implementations. Sydbox is the one I think is the most interesting.



  • N.E.P.T.R@lemmy.blahaj.zonetoLinux@lemmy.mlHardening Mint
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    2
    ·
    4 months ago

    Hardening is not useless, but it doesnt fix the architectural issues with Linux and its outdated threat model. That article says the same thing. It isnt an all-or-nothing situation, hardening still improves Linux security. Projects exist like SELinux, Bubblewrap, Crablock, Sydbox, and Landlock. Efforts to harden GNU/Linux have been made, like Kicksecure (Debian) and Secureblue (Fedora Silverblue), which protect against many threat vectors, but not perfect obviously.








  • The weakest link of any secured system is the user. I know that will never change, especially as computers/software become more complicated over time. But I don’t understand why many people argue that “since the user is the weakest link, we don’t need more secure systems, we need better users.” We need both.

    Explaination

    For anyone who suggests that a user can “just be smarter and not install malware” think about this: do you check read all the commits to the software you install, for each update, and then compile from source. The answers is no. And I don’t think we should need to.

    Linux is not secure, it is still meant for tinkerers and by design is very open. This is one of my favorite aspects of Linux, just how open it is. The result though is an insecure system with many attack vectors that are hard to protect against.

    For example, I recently wanted to patch a game for mod support. This required me to run a script that i didnt fully understand. I did my best to read it and nothing looked suspicious, but I couldn’t fully understand because I am not a modder for that game.

    This script could have done a number of things:

    • Added a fake sudo script to the path in the user’s home resulting in privilege escalation.
    • Created a user Systemd service that logs everything added to the clipboard or keylog, since that is also possible on Wayland with an LD_PRELOAD attack.
    • Create a Systemd service that records the screen to grab passwords.
    • Edit the user’s .bashrc file.
    • Delete/encrypt every file owned by the user.
    • Read and exfiltrate all app data from the $HOME
    • Or a combination of multiple other things.

    The solution is sandboxing, permission system, secure defaults, and transparency to the user. And of course a way to disable security checks for tinkerers.

    My point is that the perfect user does not exist. We (inevitably) use our computers to do all sorts of niche things, the perfect user does not even turn their PC on.